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This paper applies models of price discrimination to the motion picture industry. Movies are
durable goods with no resale market. Therefore, price discrimination using time can be used.
The distributors release the movie in two diﬀerent periods: theaters and video. The ﬁrst is a high
quality product and the second is a low quality product issued in a later point in time. The quality
gap between the two versions of the product has shrunk as the DVD technology penetrated the
market.
This paper compares two years: 1995 and 2000. Initial results show a diﬀerence between the
two years. The most evident one is a shrinkage of the time between the theatrical release and the
video release.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
When faced with heterogeneous consumers, a monopoly would like to price discriminate between
consumers with high evaluation of the product and those with a low evaluation. By doing so the
monopoly is hoping to extract a bigger portion of the consumers surplus. Detecting which are the
high valuation consumers and which are the low ones is often either impossible or illegal. The monopoly
can sometimes ﬁnd a mechanism that will help revealing the consumers type in an indirect way. This
kind of situation is called second degree price discrimination. The literature on this topic is vast and
includes numerous examples of type revealing mechanisms. These examples include discrimination
through quality and time.
This paper deals with the motion pictures industry. The type revealing mechanism used in this
industry is mainly time. Movies are issued for viewing in two periods. The ﬁrst is the theatrical
release and the second is the video rental release. Apart from the time diﬀerence, watching the
movie in theaters is more expensive then renting it but the quality of the product in its theatrical
screening version is higher than its quality in the home screening version. This situation has changed
dramatically with the introduction of DVDs. The quality gap between the two versions of the product
has shrunk as the DVD technology penetrated the market.
This paper compares two years: 1995 and 2000. The ﬁrst is before the DVD technology was
introduced to the market (March 1997) and the second is when DVD had already became a part
of the market. Initial results show a diﬀerence between the two years. The most evident one is a
shrinkage of the time between the theatrical release and the video release.
This version of the paper contains the model of price discrimination in Section 2. The data set is
described in Section 3 and preliminary results in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Price Discrimination and Time Inconsistency
This paper applies models of price discrimination and time inconsistency to the motion picture indus-
try. First, the product and the key players in this industry and the decisions they face are described.
Then the time inconsistency problem is addressed.
Movies
A movie is a durable good with no resale market. Once consumed by a certain agent, this agent
will not want to consume it again. The demand for a movie, therefore, shrinks with time and the
2seller faces in each period the residual demand from the last period. Movies are not tangible and
therefore there is no second-hand market where a consumer can sell his or her experience of watching
the movie. Two diﬀerent movies can be substitutes but it is reasonable to assume that the cross-
elasticity of demand is rather small. Movies are diﬀerentiated along many dimensions. Each movie
has its own characteristics like the plot and the cast that single it out from the other products in the
market.
The Distributors
Undoubtedly, the key players in this industry are the distribution companies. By owning the
rights for a movie the distribution company has a monopoly power over this product. It does face a
certain amount of competition from other distribution companies who may introduce similar products.
The distribution company decides when to introduce the product to the primary market of theatrical
screening, it decides when to introduce new movies to this market that will make the current products
obsolete, it also decides when to introduce the product to secondary markets of video rental and
possibly other markets in the future. The distribution company bears the advertising costs for the
movie and it also contracts with movie theaters in the various markets to screen the movie. The
distributors decision of when to introduce the movie in the ﬁrst place is not modeled here. We think
of it as their attempt to maximaize the potential demand for their product. Seasonal as well as other
considerations inﬂuence the timing of movie releases (see Einav (2003)). We take as given the fact
that the distributors have decided to release their movies optimally. We focus our interest in their
decision when to release the movie to the secondary market - the video renting.
The exhibitors
The second important player in the market are the movie theater owners or the exhibitors. The
distributors, as a monopole, negotiates with diﬀerent movie theaters in each market and contracts with
one of them. The contract between the movie theater and the distributor indicates what percentage
of the box oﬃce revenues will be transferred to the distributor. This percent usually goes down with
the weeks of screening. The price of a movie ticket is close to being constant. It does not vary across
movies or across time. Very often the contract between the exhibitor and the distributor will include
a minimal number of weeks in which the movie must be screened. Once the movie is screened the
theater owner can decide for how long will the movie be screened. This decision is, however, limited
by the contract with the distributor. Using the competition between various theaters in the same








Figure 1: The video window
market, the distributor often demands that the movie will run for a certain minimal time in order
to win an exclusive screening permit. This minimal runtime changes from movie to movie and last
between 2 to 6 weeks. Beyond this period the movie theater may keep screening the movie or replace
it with another movie.
Consumers
Diﬀerent consumers value each movie diﬀerently. The quality of a movie and the utility from
consuming it depends on the characteristics of the movie and on the individual preferences of the con-
sumer. A movie j is assumed to have an intrinsic quality Qj. The utility for consumer i for consuming
am o v i ej depends on the consumer’s type θ
i
j which is distributed according to Fj. Consumption of a
movie can be done in two periods of time. A consumer may choose to go to the movie in the theater
and consume the movie in its high quality version, qHQj. After a certain period of time, however,
this product may not be available at the theaters. In this case the consumer will have to wait an
additional time until the product is introduced in the market of movie rentals. The quality of the
product in its video rental version is lower, qLQj. The face prices of the product in its two quality
versions are known in advanced pH and pL respectively. The two unknown elements to the consumers
are the length of time the movie will be screened in the theaters, T1, and the time until the product
is issued in its lower quality version, T2.




4where q is either qH or qL, t is the time passed from the theatrical release of the movie and p(t)
is the price incurred by the consumer for going to the movie at time t. We assume that V (·,·,·) is
increasing in its two ﬁrst elements and decreasing in the third. The face price of the movie is indeed
pH is the ﬁrst period and pL at the second period. If p(t) i st a k e nt ob et h ef a c ev a l u eo fw a t c h i n g
the movie, then it is clear from (1) that if a certain consumer prefers to watch the movie on the big
screen he or she will want to do that at t =0and if they prefer to watch it on video they would
like to do it at t = T2. Both the exhibitors and the video rental stores (not modeled in this paper)
have capacity constraints - they cannot accommodate all the movie watchers on the day the movie
comes to the screens or to the video stores. However, lines at the movie theaters or lack of available
copies at the rental store increase the price that the consumer actually faces. After a while when these
capacity constraints are non binding anymore the face price is the actual price paid by the consumer.
Figure (2) describes the price paid by consumers in the various time periods of the model. A special
treatment of availability and pricing in the movie rental market appears in Dana (2001) and Dana &
Spier (2001).
To simplify the discussion we make the following assumptions. T1 is regarded as the eﬀort put
by the exhibitors to market the product. Higher T1 may attract more consumers to watch the movie
at the theaters. T2 is the price discrimination device used by the distributors to distinguish between
diﬀerent types of consumers. Prices are ﬁx e da te a c hp e r i o d .
For each movie j the distribution of types θ
i
j is Fj and deﬁned over a set Θ of all possible types.
Given T1 and T2, the consumers are divided into the following three groups.






∃t0 ∈ [0,T 1] such that
V (θ,q H,t 0) −p(t0) ≥ V (θ,qL,t 00) − p(t00) ∀t00 ≥ T2











∃t00 ≥ T2 such that
V (θ,q L,t 00) −p(t00) ≥ V (θ,q H,t 0) −p(t0) ∀t0 ∈ [0,T 1]





Group 3: Outside optioners:
Θo = Θ\(Θ1 ∪ Θ2).
The total demand for the movie in the ﬁrst period is
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Figure 2: Price of watching a movie as seen by consumers
We assume that ∂DH/∂qH < 0, ∂DH/∂qL > 0, ∂DH/∂pH < 0, ∂DH/∂pL > 0, ∂DH/∂T1 > 0
and ∂DH/∂T2 > 0. It means that as the product stays longer in the market the monopoly is more
likely to collect revenues from consumers with high evaluation of the product. In the second period
the monopoly oﬀers the same product but in its reduced quality qL and a reduced price pL.T h e
monopoly then faces the residual demand




Here we assume that ∂DL/∂qH < 0, ∂DL/∂qL > 0, ∂DL/∂pH > 0, ∂DL/∂pL < 0,a n d∂DL/∂T2 < 0.
∂DL/∂T1 can be either positive or negative. On one hand the longer the movie stays on screens the
less is the residual demand left on the other hand long time in the theaters may serve as a positive
signal for the quality of the movie.
2.1 One-shot Game With No Commitment
The problem the monopoly distributor is facing is
max
T2:T2≥T1
αpHDH(qH,qL,p H,p L,T 1,T 2)+βe−rT2pLDL(qH,qL,p H,p L,T 1,T 2) (4)
6where α and β are the portion of the revenues from the theatrical screening and the video rentals
respectively and r is the interest rate. The decision about T1 is done by the theater owners. This
decision can depend on a pre-committed T2 by the movie distributor. We denote this expected variable
by Te
2. Therefore, the theater’s problem is
max
T1
(1 − α)pHDH(qH,qL,p H,p L,T 1,Te
2) −cT1 (5)
where c is the cost of screening the movie per period. The following time inconsistency problem arises.
Given the decision about the length of the theatrical release, the distributor will choose to release
the movie to the video-rental market immediately after its theatrical run is over. In other words, the
solution for (4) is T2 = T1. Thus, with no commitment mechanism the theater movies will conclude
that Te
2 = T1. The set of consumers that will consume the product in its theatrical release version
will be very small. With no commitment mechanism this set can be empty. Solving (5) with this
restriction will lead to a very low choice of T1 or even to T1 =0 .
2.2 One-shot Game With Commitment
The distributor announces T2 before T1 is chosen by the the movie theaters and the announced T2 is
implement. The movie theaters have a best response function T∗
1 (T2). This best response function is





(1 − α)pH .
The change in T∗















wherever these second derivatives exist. When they do, the second derivative in the denominator is
negative and thus the sign of
∂T ∗
1
∂T2 depends on the sign of the cross partial derivative of DH with
respect to T1 and T2.
The equilibrium with commitment is likely to produce higher proﬁts for both the distributors and
the movie theaters.
2.3 The Repeated Game
The with commitment is clearly preferable to the no commitment one but with no enforcement mech-
anism it is unachievable. Assume now that the game is repeated inﬁnitely many times. Both the
7distributors and the movie theaters maximize the discounted sum of the proﬁts from each stage of
the game. As it is always the case with repeated games, the equilibrium (and strategies) of the no-
commitment game can be repeated inﬁnitely many times and this can be a possible outcome path
of the repeated game. We are interested, however, in more interesting possibilities that can arise
from the repeated game. More precisely, it is possible to show that for a big enough discount rate
we can support the with-commitment outcome as an equilibrium outcome of the repeated game. In
order to do that, the movie theaters should use a strategy in which they threat that if the movie
distributors deviate from the with-commitment strategy even once they will then resort to a strategy
of no theatrical screening at all forever.
3D a t a
The data for this paper was gathered from various internet sites. The ﬁrst is the magazine Variety.1 It
publishes, on a weekly basis, data about all the movies that were screened in the US and provides data
about their performance at the box oﬃce. The second source is Hollywood.com site that provides the
exact dates of theatrical release and video release for each movie.2 Data were collected for two years:
1995 and 2000. The choice of these two years is arbitrary apart from the fact that 1995 is before
the appearance of DVDs and 2000 is after. Monthly sales of DVD players were used as an indication
for the market penetration of this technology. The data is published by the Consumer Electronics
Association.3 Table 1 describes the variables.
Table 1: The variables in the data set
Variable name Description
totweek The total number of weeks where the movie was screened
week100 Number of weeks until the number of screens fell under 100
week10p Number of weeks until the number of screens fell under 10% of the maximum
totbox Total revenues at the box oﬃce - US only
openbox Revenues in the ﬁrst week of screening - US only
openeng Number of engagements that screened the movie on the opening week
meng The maximal number of engagements that screened the movie at a certain week
window The time between theatrical release and video rental release
The market penetration of DVDs is described in Figure 3.
1http://www.variety.com.
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Figure 3: DVD palyers sales in the US from 1997
4 Empirical Results
The ﬁrst comparison between 1995 and 2000 reﬂects the diﬀerences in the distribution of the time
that movies spent in the theaters and the time between the theatrical release and the video release.
Figure 4 describes the cumulative distribution of the variable window for both 1995 and 2000.
Figure 4 clearly show that there is a shift in the distribution of variable window and that the
distribution in 1995 stochastically dominates that of 2000. The eﬀect of demand shifts on the distri-
bution of the length of theatrical screening is less obvious. As Figure 5 shows there is a stochastic
dominance relation but it is weaker and is probably insigniﬁcant.
The next step is to check how the length of the theatrical screening aﬀects the window of time
between the theatrical release and the video release. In order to take into account the fact the
diﬀerences in the quality of the movies the following semiparametric model was estimated.
window = f(totweek)+mengβ + ε (6)
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Figure 5: Cumulative distribution function of the time since theatrical release until the number of
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Figure 6: The nonparametric part of model (6).
5 Conclusions and Further Research
The preliminary results show a diﬀerence between the pre and the post DVD introduction. The
reduction in the quality gap between the movies in their theatrical screening version and their video
rental version, as caused a reduction in the time the distributors wait between the theatrical release
and the video release. The model in Section 2 was set in a nonparametric way. Therefore at this
point most of the comparative static is impossible. Moreover, a welfare analysis can be interesting
but requires estimation of the demand functions. Both courses of action are planned.
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